While I agree in principle... I've found that Shadow Copy is one of the hidden gems of Windoze, and it literally takes an afternoon to get a really good grip on the technology and then it becomes second nature. It can save you a MFT of grief down the road; ie, 5 minutes restoring/archiving a user's My Documents folder on a machine that had been royally reamed by one of the early crypto-ransomware virii.
Really... there IS some good shit in the middle of all the data-mining assache of the modern connected age. The straightforward nature of both Task Scheduler and Shadow Copy are two of those that REALLY require VERY LITTLE expenditure of time to get a good grasp of; you do yourself a disservice by throwing hands up in the air and saying "not worth it".
What is this "crypto-ransomware virii" of which you speak? And why didn't it do an effective job of screwing the shadow copies? Fundamentally I don't have the brainpower to keep up with all these problems, even though I read comp.risks
I'm sure there are useful shiny geegaws, but there's the concept of polishing a turd.
Looking at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shadow_Copy it appears that at the user level MS has triumphantly reinvented incremental backups to an external disk, possibly incorporating some concepts from source code control systems. At the operating system level that is more useful, since a user won't be able to understand what's happened in the OS. But I've never had a problem like that with Linux.
It also appears that they add and subtract functionality over time.
Shadow Copy is MS' answer to Schlock Mercenary's maxim that
"Did you back it up?" is geekspeak for "I can't fix this." or "I can't fix this without an enormous amount of assache."
It is intended to be used in conjunction with a sensible backup plan, not as a replacement. However, as an IT service PROFESSIONAL, I am thankful that it exists, as I have no control over whether a particular (l)user is competent or a complete 1d10t. Even for a sensible user who actually does periodic backups, it CAN be useful to save a file that has
suffered drastic changes been hugely updated since the last backup.
I don't see this as "polishing a turd"; I see it as "responding to the users" and their not-too-unreasonable cries that "I have a machine which can do anything automatically. MAKE BACKUPS EASIER, FFS!!!" That is, after all, the main reason of a backup regimen... to save you massive amounts of time recreating lost work, no matter how that work was lost.
Shadow Copy is the mechanism by which they do this. That mechanism was chosen to be able to work in BOTH a standalone install and a domain install; by its nature that combination imposes a LOT of restrictions on how it can work.
As to the question of "Why didn't the ransomware fuckerize the Shadow copies as well...?" in this particular case the answer is... time. I got to it before it was able to encrypt ALL the shadow copies; Windoze restricts application access to shadow copies specifically to prevent virii from being able to fuckerize them.Task Manager suffers similar restrictions in the mechanism, on top of which it has to be managed by network group and administrative policies. It is no different from creating a daemon in *NIX, aside from the fact it collects them all into a single place for you to manage them. That REALLY is a no-brainer, IMHO.
mnem