Disclaimer: I'm not in the medical device industry but another failure critical industry, space. So while some principles I describe below apply, the details I'm sure are quite different and the regulations are -rightly!- much more stringent in the medical world.
I think all this talk fixating on finding mitigations for individual failure modes ("
Use a laptop, battery power is safe!" - "
Add high-Z electrodes!" - "
Healthy humans in benign circumstances are robust" - "
Use a RasPi, more safe!" - "
Use WiFi, airgapped!") show one fundamental misunderstanding, which makes the medical equipment pros on the forum so queasy to give more help than saying "please don't":
Fixing some issue you found is not the point.Chances are there's another issue that you didn't fix, and your gizmo is only as safe as the unsafest link.
Instead, you need to do proper Reliability Engineering!Eg, start with a
FMEA, a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis: Basically you go through all components, all functions, all interactions etc in a formal way, and identify all failure modes at all steps. Then you analyse the effects each failure mode has, and (at least in space, where we like to do
FMECA instead of FMEA to better direct resources), the criticality of each failure. Most will be trivial. Some will be critical but known in advance. Some will be critical and new.
Only THEN can you argue that fixing failure mode X makes the device more safe, as you KNOW there's no more serious failure mode you didn't fix.
What happens next depends on the requirements you have to comply with. No idea about medical, I'd expect them to be pretty stringent. In our world, typically you require no
single point failure shall propagate to a system failure, and call it a day once the system is proven to be SPF free and achieves the required reliability. Sometimes we even waive individual SPFs. Yes, we're cheap. But we also don't mass-produce devices that are applied to warm bodies in uncontrolled conditions, for us it's just a billion or so going up in smoke. Cheap.
I imagine the medical device pros will (rightly) criticise me for over-simplifying, as I'm sure LOADS of critical analysis comes on top, which is what makes all the paperwork so expensive (paper itself being cheap)
In particular, I would not be surprised if in the medical world you also are required to consider multiple failures and do a
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).
Much more complex, you think of any undesirable outcome and, using formal logic, work backwards through
all ways this can come to pass.
Anyway, by immediately thinking about applying band-aids to individual failure modes, instead of analysing the overall system in a way that allows to capture all failure modes in a traceable way, you demonstrate you have not understood the point the medical pros in this thread were trying to make: you need to make your gizmo certified reliable to plug in humans.
Hence no help in finding better band-aids.
And I'd like to chime in with the medical pros: apply to your own body what you will (I know I have), but
DON'T EVER work on test subjects this way.