After having read the report, it's once again scary how much had to go wrong for the plane to crash. If only one of these things hadn't happened, the people on that machine would still be alive:
- Even though the rudder travel limiter gave errors about two dozen times during the last 3 months before the crash, it apparently was never checked, instead the computer that controls it was repeatedly turned off and on again. This is surprising, since the error message displayed to the pilots specifically mentioned the rudder travel limiter. What was checked were electrical connections, but always while the plane was on the ground, and standing still.
- The pilots decide to try a procedure forbidden by the flight manuals, rebooting a flight computer mid-air. They could have disabled it and switched to manual control instead.
- Apparently, pilots these days rely so much on the autopilot, that it doesn't occur to them to fly a plane themselves, the old fashioned way, with a hand on the stick and an eye on the 4 most important instruments (airspeed, altimeter, vertical speed, artifical horizon). When the autopilot disconnected and the plane started banking because of the stuck rudder, it took 9 seconds for a pilot to take control. And then, he acted erratically, maybe being confused by the feeling of the plane rolling, as opposed to just watching the artificial horizon.
- The captain gives ambigous commands ("level"... but what, pitch or wings?, and "pull down" - so is that pull on the stick (pointing the nose up) or pushing the nose down?) which the flying first officer interprets in the wrong way, stalling the plane.
- The captain doesn't realize that the first officer is holding his stick way back, and that therefore his attempts to point the nose down were ineffective. If he had realized what the first office was doing, he could have disabled the first officer's stick with the push of a button.
- Neither pilot seems to notice that near the end of the flight, the plane is basically dropping like a stone while being level. Again, a look at the most basic instruments would have confirmed that. Now, the report claims they weren't trained for this situation, but it doesn't seem far-fetched to me that had they realized what was happening, they would have come to the conclusion that they needed to drop the nose to gain speed.
Now, I'm not saying that the pilots were incompetent. It's a difficult situation; night flight over the ocean, i.e. looking out the window tells you nothing. Several malfunctions, and all of a sudden the plane starts banking on its own. It seems likely enough that they were wondering whether they could trust their instruments (in fact, the captain having the active air speed indicator switched indicates that he doubted his readings). It seems like they lost situation awareness, the first officer who was flying (and stalling the plane) did for sure.
It just seems crazy that all of those 6 points mentioned above had to go wrong for the plane to crash. If any one of them happened differently, chances are they would have made it. The thing that bothers me is that there isn't an easy single clear thing that we can fix forever so this never happens again. Well, there is maybe one thing... with critical infrastructure such as an airplane, it shouldn't be possible that the same error pops up two dozen times, and noone notices the repetitive nature. If every plane was assigned a caretaker that is aware of every minor issue concerning a given plane, such problem would be noticed, hopefully. I'm not 100% sure I understand the wording in the report correctly, but I think that was one of the recommendations they gave. Problem is, how to handle that in practice? They had technical systems for that, but they failed because those minor issues weren't logged. So that person would probably have to stay with the plane, and talk to the flight crews on a daily basis. Sounds like a shitty job, if that plane ends up on different places all the time.